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a b s t r a c t
Identifying with a body is central to being a conscious self. The now classic “rubber hand illusion”
demonstrates that the experience of body-ownership can be modulated by manipulating the timing of
exteroceptive (visual and tactile) body-related feedback. Moreover, the strength of this modulation is
related to individual differences in sensitivity to internal bodily signals (interoception). However the
interaction of exteroceptive and interoceptive signals in determining the experience of body-ownership
within an individual remains poorly understood. Here, we demonstrate that this depends on the online
integration of exteroceptive and interoceptive signals by implementing an innovative “cardiac rubber
hand illusion” that combined computer-generated augmented-reality with feedback of interoceptive
(cardiac) information. We show that both subjective and objective measures of virtual-hand ownership
are enhanced by cardio-visual feedback in-time with the actual heartbeat, as compared to asynchronous
feedback. We further show that these measures correlate with individual differences in interoceptive
sensitivity, and are also modulated by the integration of proprioceptive signals instantiated using real-
time visual remapping of ﬁnger movements to the virtual hand. Our results demonstrate that
interoceptive signals directly inﬂuence the experience of body ownership via multisensory integration,
and they lend support to models of conscious selfhood based on interoceptive predictive coding.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
The experience of body ownership (EBO) – of owning and
identifying with a particular body – is a central aspect of selfhood
(Bermudez, Marcel, & Eilan, 1995; Blanke, 2012; Blanke &
Metzinger, 2009). Although under normal circumstances EBO
appears highly stable, there is increasing evidence to indicate that
EBO depends on dynamic “on-the-ﬂy” multisensory integration of
self-related signals and is hence surprisingly open to change.
In the “rubber hand illusion” (RHI), the stroking of an artiﬁcial
hand synchronously with a participant's real hand, while visual
attention is focused on the artiﬁcial hand, leads the participant to
experience the artiﬁcial hand as part of his or her own body
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Similar synchronous visuo-tactile
stimulation can enhance self-identiﬁcation with the face of
another (the “enfacement illusion”, Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, &
Aglioti, 2010; Tsakiris, 2008) and can even facilitate an illusory
sense of identiﬁcation with a virtual whole body (Lenggenhager,
Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007) or with the body of another
person (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008). These studies exemplify the
strong inﬂuence of exteroceptive inputs – the perception of the
body from the outside – in shaping self-models based on multi-
sensory integration. A separate tradition emphasizes the impor-
tance of interoception – the sense of the internal physiological state
of the body – in underpinning the sense of self (Craig, 2009;
Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004; Damasio,
2010; Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011). Interoceptive representa-
tions reﬂect the perception of the body from the inside and
contribute to the regulation of physiological integrity (home-
ostasis) and associated affective feelings, drives and emotions.
A central theme within these models is that selfhood emerges
through elaboration of interoceptive representations and their
integration with exteroceptive signals within cortical regions,
notably the anterior portions of the insular cortex.
Given these two traditions, it is natural to ask how exterocep-
tive and interoceptive signals interact in specifying EBO and the
sense of self. Tsakiris and colleagues capitalized on individual
variation in interoceptive sensitivity (IS), which refers to a person's
ability to detect their own interoceptive signals. They report that
participants with lower IS are more susceptible to the RHI
(Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jimenez, & Costantini, 2011) and exhibit larger
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changes in self-other boundaries during the enfacement illusion
(Tajadura-Jimenez, Longo, Coleman, & Tsakiris, 2012; Tajadura-
Jimenez & Tsakiris, in press). IS is standardly gauged as the
capacity to report accurately the timing of one's heartbeat at rest
and is considered a stable characterological trait (Schandry, 1981).
Other evidence links physiological state to EBO: Perceived threat
or injury to an artiﬁcial hand during the RHI leads to increased
skin conductance responses (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003).
Induction of the RHI also leads to decreased temperature
(Moseley et al., 2008) and increased histamine reactivity
(Barnsley et al., 2011) of the real hand, while cooling the real
hand increases susceptibility to the RHI (Kammers, Rose, &
Haggard, 2011). Although these studies provide circumstantial
support for the interaction of exteroceptive with interoceptive
processes in EBO, they do not address the important question of
how this interaction is supported by multisensory integration
across these different domains.
Here, we address this question by implementing a novel
“cardiac rubber hand illusion” capitalizing on augmented reality
(AR) technology and integrating this with physiological (cardiac)
monitoring. This approach allows us to superimpose a “virtual
rubber hand” within a participant's visual ﬁeld, the visual appear-
ance of which can be modulated by cardiac signals such that the
modulation is either in synchrony, or out of synchrony, with the
participant's actual heartbeat. Feedback synchronicity thereby
directly probes interactions between exteroceptive perception
and short-term interoceptive representations of heartbeats. The
usefulness of this approach has very recently been explored in the
related context of the full-body illusion (Aspell et al., in press).
Distinctively, our setup also enables an AR implementation of the
RHI paradigm involving tactile-visual feedback, and – extending
the classical RHI – proprioceptive-visual integration wherein
movements of the real hand are dynamically mirrored by corre-
sponding movements of the virtual hand. Our primary ﬁnding is
that synchronous – as compared to asynchronous – cardio-visual
feedback leads to an enhanced experience of ownership of the
virtual hand, indicating that EBO in this context can be modulated
by multisensory integration across exteroceptive and interoceptive
domains. We also show that accurate visual feedback of inten-
tional hand movements, supporting peri-hand visual-propriocep-
tive coherence provides a powerful cue for EBO that can
overshadow cardio-visual feedback. Lastly, we examined how the
magnitude of our results reﬂected individual differences in IS,
testing the prediction that heightened IS will attenuate EBO
(Tsakiris et al., 2011) yet exaggerate interaction between exter-
oceptive and interoceptive manipulations. We interpret our results
in the light of emerging models of selfhood based on “predictive
processing” which focus existing multisensory integration
accounts (e.g., Makin, Holmes, & Ehrsson, 2008) by positing that
experiences of selfhood and body ownership are determined by
the brain's estimation of the most likely interpretation of the
ensemble of self-related signals, computed according to Bayesian
principles (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013; Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner, &
Kiebel, 2010; Seth et al., 2011).
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Twenty-one volunteers took part in the experiment (mean age 21.2; SE¼3.1; 10
male; two left handed). Participants were recruited via our laboratory website and
notice boards. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the School of
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Fig. 1. Experimental setup and design. (A) Participants sat facing a desk so that their physical hand was out of sight when they looked downward and ahead. A 3D model of
the real hand was captured by the Kinect and used to generate a real-time virtual hand which was projected into the head-mounted display (HMD) at the location of the AR
marker. Subjects wore a front-facing camera connected to the HMD so they saw the camera image superimposed with the virtual hand. They also wore a pulse-oximeter to
measure heartbeat timings, and they used their right hand to make behavioral responses. (B) Cardio-visual feedback was implemented by changing the color of the virtual
hand from its natural color (top-left) towards red (top-right) and back, over 500 ms either synchronously or asynchronously with the heartbeat. Tactile feedback was given
by a paintbrush, which was rendered into the AR environment (bottom-left). Objective measurements of virtual hand ownership depended on a, proprioceptive drift’ (PD)
test adapted for the AR environment, involving a virtual measure and cursor whose scale and position were aligned with the real world (bottom-right). (C) The main
experiment consisted of three blocks of four trials each, preceded by a practice trial. Each trial consisted of two PD tests ﬂanking an induction period during which either
cardio-visual or tactile-visual feedback was provided (120 s). Each trial ended with a questionnaire presented in the HMD. Before the main experiment each participant's
interoceptive sensitivity was measured.
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Psychology at the University of Sussex. All participants gave their informed consent
prior to starting the experiment.
2.2. Experimental setup
Participants sat facing a desk with their left hand placed to the left of a vertical
partition, out of sight (Fig. 1A). This hand was aligned with a small marker to ensure
a distance between the real hand and virtual hand of 19 cm. Their body centre was
situated to the right of the partition approximately 40 cm to the right of their real
hand. They wore a head-mounted-display (HMD, HMZ-T2, Sony, Tokyo, Japan)
ﬁtted with a forward-facing camera (HD Pro Webcam C920, Logitech, Lausanne,
Switzerland). The image presented in the HMD consisted of the real-time camera
input superimposed with a three-dimensional real-time model of their real hand,
which appeared spatially located to the right of the partition in an anatomically
plausible position. Participants directed their gaze and attention on this location
during the experiment. They used their right hand (also located outside the ﬁeld of
view) to make responses via a dedicated input device (PowerMate, Grifﬁn
Technology, TN, USA). During the main experiment they wore a pulse oximeter
(XPOD with 8000AA ﬁnger clip sensory, Nonin Medical Inc., MN, USA) on their right
index ﬁnger to obtain real-time cardiovascular timing information. This allowed us
to modulate the visual appearance of the virtual hand as a function of cardiac cycle,
thus implementing “cardio-visual feedback”. In some conditions, the participant's
left hand was gently stroked by the experimenter using a paintbrush at a frequency
of 1 Hz (following the standard RHI paradigm), and the visual image of this
stroking was also modeled and re-presented in the HMD to provide tactile-visual
feedback. A video illustrating the setup and the experimental conditions is
provided in Supplementary information.
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.08.014.
2.3. Augmented reality and tactile/cardio-visual feedback
As shown in Fig. 1A, a Microsoft Kinect (Kinect for Windows, Microsoft, WA,
US) was mounted above the table, facing downwards, 70 cm above the participant's
real hand. We developed custom-software using the freely available “ARToolkit”
(http://www.hitl.washington.edu/artoolkit/) to link the Kinect with the HMD and
the head-mounted camera. Using this software, a 3D hand model captured by the
Kinect was projected onto the location of a marker (AR marker) through the HMD,
in real-time, so that the virtual hand appeared as part of the real world as seen
through the HMD via the CMOS camera. Speciﬁcally, “point cloud” data (RGB
images with accompanying depth maps) were streamed from the Kinect, trimmed
by the 70 cm cut-off distance, and then directly rendered into the AR environment
using OpenGL. In contrast to the classical RHI setup, our 3D hand model is highly
photo-realistic and is capable of capturing and re-projecting hand-movements in
real-time. In conditions requiring tactile-visual feedback, the paintbrush-stroking
was also rendered into the AR environment, either synchronously or asynchro-
nously (delayed by 500 ms) with the real paintbrush movements.
Cardio-visual feedback was implemented by using information from the pulse-
oximeter to modify the real-time rendering of the 3D hand model (Fig. 1B). To
compensate delay in oximeter data acquisition and processing we designed custom
software which estimated the timing of each heartbeat based on the average period
of the 10 preceding heartbeats (see below). Within the AR system, this was used to
trigger a gentle pulsing of the color of the virtual hand to red, and back again. Each
pulse lasted 500 ms during which the red component in the image linearly
increased (250 ms) and then linearly diminished (250 ms). The peak redness was
40% of the maximum possible. During synchronous feedback, we delivered peak
redness to coincide with the ejection of blood from the heart (systole). This
required compensation for the temporal lag of the pulse oximeter and necessitated
an estimation of cardiac cycle timing from previous heartbeats. Asynchronous
feedback was implemented by changing the frequency of estimated heart-rate to
be either slower (70%) or faster (130%). Slow and fast asynchronous trials occurred
equally often for each participant and their timing was counterbalanced across
participants.
Following our previously established procedures (Garﬁnkel et al., 2013; Gray
et al., 2012; Gray, Minati, Paoletti, & Critchley, 2010) we estimated the cardiac R-
wave (indicating ventricular depolarization) as occurring 350 ms preceding the
peak of the ﬁnger pulse oximetry waveform, reﬂecting pulse transit time and the
delay between R-wave and peak cardiac ejection. By considering (10) previous
peaks we could predict the occurrence of each subsequent R-wave with validated
accuracy (o20 ms s.d.). The peak color modulation in cardio-visual feedback was
then timed to coincide with peak systolic pressure (200–250 ms, we used a value of
210 ms following estimated R-wave). This peak pressure is when aortic barorecep-
tors are most active and is also when heartbeats are typically perceived in tests of
interoceptive sensitivity (Brener, Liu, & Ring, 1993; Wiens & Palmer, 2001). We note
that time window for cardio-visual feedback has sufﬁcient overlap with the period
of peak systolic pressure to accommodate ﬂuctuations due to signal processing and
rendering (770 ms) and any individual variation in pulse transit time (e.g., due to
differences in arm length) of 100 ms or less (a range highly unlikely to be exceeded
in our healthy young population). We further emphasize that the asynchronous
feedback was truly asynchronous and distinct fromminor phase shifts in the timing
of visual feedback for any one individual.
2.4. Experimental procedure
Following a test of individual interoceptive sensitivity (see Section 2.7 below),
each participant began the main experiment which was organized into three
blocks, with each block containing four trials (Fig. 1C). Each trial started with a 20 s
resting period in which only the background was shown through the HMD (i.e., no
virtual hand). Following this was a ﬁrst “proprioceptive drift” test, designed to
measure ownership of the virtual hand objectively (see Section 2.5 below). After
this came the “induction period” (120 s) during which the participant paid
attention to their virtual hand; the nature of this period varied according to
experimental condition (see below). After this came a second proprioceptive drift
test, followed by a short questionnaire presented through the HMD, providing a
subjective assessment of ownership (see Section 2.6, below). Each trial lasted
3.5 min and the entire experiment lasted 1.5 h. After each block participants
took a short break during which they removed the HMD for comfort. Before the
ﬁrst block, a practice trial was provided to ensure that participants were familiar
with the paradigm.
Induction periods in each trial were drawn from 1 of 3 different conditions,
with each condition divided into synchronous and asynchronous feedback sub-
conditions. In the ﬁrst condition (“cardiac still”) participants were instructed to
keep their left hand still, and to focus their gaze and attention on the visual pulsing
of the virtual hand. In the second condition (“cardiac move”) participants were
instructed to move their ﬁngers without any constraints other than to keep their
hand in the same place, while still focusing on the virtual hand. In both these
conditions the virtual hand was modulated by cardio-visual feedback for the full
120 s. In the third condition (“tactile”) the real hand was stroked with a paintbrush
while tactile-visual feedback was presented via the HMD; again participants were
asked to focus on the virtual hand. At the start of each trial, participants were
informed of the corresponding condition (“cardiac still”, “cardiac move”, “tactile”);
they were not informed whether the feedback would be synchronous or asyn-
chronous. The ﬁrst block contained only “tactile” trials. The second and third blocks
contained both “cardiac still” and “cardiac move” trials, with trial order and
feedback synchrony counterbalanced across participants.
2.5. Proprioceptive drift
Before and after each induction period participants were asked to indicate the
perceived location of their real hand, providing a measure of proprioceptive drift
(PD, Fig. 1). In each PD test, participants were presented via the HMD with a scene
containing a virtual ruler, a cursor, and the AR marker. The remainder of the image
was uniformly black. They were asked to use the input device to move the cursor to
point to the perceived location of their left hand. PD was calculated as the distance
(in cm) from the real hand to the perceived location. The position of the cursor and
ruler relative to the AR marker position was randomly chosen in each test (in the
range [3, 0] cm from the actual left index ﬁnger position), preventing participants
Table 1
Subjective questionnaire. Q1 and Q3 assess subjectively the EBO of the virtual hand, while Q2 and Q4 are control questions which are designed to impose equivalent
attentional demands without relating speciﬁcally to EBO. Q5 assesses whether subjects can detect synchronous as compared to asynchronous feedback. Responses were
collected on a 7-point continuous visual analog scale with 3 representing “strongly disagree” and þ3 “strongly agree”, though any intermediate point could be selected.
Question
Q1 It felt as if the virtual hand was my hand
Q2 It seemed as if I had more than one left hand
Q3 It seemed as if I were feeling a table in the location where the virtual hand was
Q4 It felt as if I no longer had a left hand, as if my left hand had disappeared
Q5 Was visual feedback synchronized to the tactile stimuli? [Tactile]/was cardio feedback in time with your own heartbeats? [Cardio]
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from memorizing previous positions which could otherwise induce carry-over
effects between tests (Tsakiris et al., 2011). For each trial, we computed as an
objective measure of virtual hand ownership the “proprioceptive drift difference”
PDD, which is the difference between pre-induction and post-induction PD, so that
positive values indicated increased drift and hence increased ownership (Tsakiris
et al., 2011).
2.6. Questionnaire
In the questionnaire period at the end of each trial, participants were presented
with ﬁve questions sequentially via the HMD (see Table 1; the rest of the image was
black). The order of presentation was the same in each trial. Participants answered
each question using the input device. The ﬁrst four questions were adapted from
Botvinick and Cohen (1998), [Q1–Q4] and were designed to assess the strength of
the subjective experience of virtual hand ownership. Question 5 asked participants
to judge whether cardio-visual or tactile-visual feedback had been synchronous or
asynchronous.
2.7. Interoceptive sensitivity
Individual IS was measured by a “feedback” task based on Whitehead, Drescher,
Heiman, and Blackwell (1977), in which participants were asked to judge whether
auditory cardiac feedback was synchronous or asynchronous with their heartbeat.
Auditory feedback was provided as 150 ms pulses of a 2000 Hz tone, which in the
synchronous condition, were timed to occur 230 ms after the electrocardiographic
R-wave signifying diastole (estimated to occur 120 ms prior to oximeter onset);
asynchronous feedback was generated by altering the estimated heart-rate to be
either faster (130%) or slower (70%) than that recorded by the oximeter. Partici-
pants completed 16 trials each lasting 10 s, 8 with synchronous and 8 with
asynchronous (50% faster, 50% slower) feedback. IS was calculated as the propor-
tion of correct trials. We chose this method as opposed to an alternative based on
counting heartbeats (Schandry, 1981) because it depends on comparing interocep-
tive and exteroceptive (auditory) signals and plausibly involves multisensory
integration.
3. Results
3.1. Cardio-visual and tactile-visual feedback modulate
proprioceptive drift
To examine whether the timing of cardio-visual and tactile-
visual feedback modulated the experience of body ownership as
measured by PDD, we performed a within-subject 2-way ANOVA
with “condition” (cardiac still, cardiac move, tactile) and “feed-
back” (synchronous, asynchronous) as within-subjects variables.
We found a main effect of both condition [F(2,40)¼5.00, p¼0.012]
and feedback [F(1,20)¼17.81, po0.001]. Critically, we found a
signiﬁcant interaction between condition and feedback [F(2,40)¼
47.97, p¼0.019)] indicating that the degree of modulation of PDD
by feedback accuracy varied across conditions (Fig. 2). To explore
this, we conducted planned t-tests comparing synchronous vs.
asynchronous feedback in each condition, correcting for multiple
comparisons using the false discovery rate (pFDR, Benjamini &
Hochberg, 1995). (Note that all t-tests reported in this paper were
two-tailed.) PDD was signiﬁcantly higher for synchronous as
compared to asynchronous feedback in the conditions “cardiac
still” [t(20)¼2.70, p¼0.014, pFDR¼0.021] and “tactile” [t(20)¼3.20,
p¼0.004, pFDR¼0.013], but not in “cardiac move” [t(20)¼0.34,
p¼0.714]. Thus, according to the PDD measure, synchronous
cardio-visual feedback leads to enhanced ownership (PDD¼
3.16 cm, SEM71.03) as compared to asynchronous feedback
(PDD¼1.02 cm, SEM 70.72). Note that there was no signiﬁcant
difference in PDD (“cardiac still” condition) between slow and fast
asynchronous feedback [t(40)¼1.03, p¼0.310].
The same pattern of results held for synchronous
(PDD¼5.81 cm, SEM 71.03) as compared to asynchronous
(PDD¼1.81 cm, SEM 71.20) tactile-visual feedback, replicating
the classical RHI ﬁndings. In the “cardiac move” condition PDD is
high in both feedback conditions (synchronous PDD¼4.51 cm,
SEM 71.04; asynchronous PDD¼4.51 cm, SEM 71.03) with no
signiﬁcant difference. PD magnitudes in our study (averaged
across subjects) were comparable with those observed in other
RHI experiments (Makin et al., 2008).
3.2. Cardio-visual and tactile-visual feedback modulate subjective
experience of ownership
We next analyzed data from the questionnaire presented on
each trial by deﬁning two variables: “ownership” as the average of
ratings of questions 1 and 3, and “control” as the average across
questions 2 and 4. Fig. 3 shows these summary statistics, averaged
across subjects, in each condition (see Table S1 in Supplementary
information for a full breakdown of responses). A within-subjects
32 ANOVA for “ownership” revealed signiﬁcant main effects of
both condition [F(2,40)¼6.8964, p¼0.003], and feedback [F(1,20)¼
7.6237, po0.001], and an interaction approaching signiﬁcance
between condition and feedback [F(2,40)¼3.1802, p¼0.052], which
we explored using planned t-tests comparing synchronous and
asynchronous feedback. Consistent with the PD analysis, in condi-
tion “cardiac still” ownership was rated higher for synchronous
(0.358, SEM70.30) as opposed to asynchronous cardio-visual feed-
back (0.126, SEM70.27, t(20)¼2.366, p¼0.028, pFDR¼0.042)
(units reﬂect a continuous visual-analog scale with range [3,3]).
The same pattern was found in the “tactile” condition (synchronous
0.916, SEM70.23; asynchronous 0.143, SEM70.23; t(20)¼4.409,
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Fig. 2. Cardio-visual feedback modulates EBO as measured objectively by proprio-
ceptive drift difference (PDD). PDDs were signiﬁcantly larger for synchronous
versus asynchronous cardio-visual feedback in the “cardiac still” but not the
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Fig. 3. Cardio-visual feedback modulates EBO as measured subjectively via ques-
tionnaire. Each bar shows mean (and standard error) visual analog scale responses
for “ownership” questions and “control” questions. Ownership was signiﬁcantly
higher for synchronous feedback in both “cardiac still” and “tactile” conditions, but
not in “cardiac move”. There were no signiﬁcant differences for the control
questions in any condition.
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po0.001, pFDRo0.001), but fell just short of signiﬁcance in the
“cardiac move” condition where ownership was rated high for both
synchronous (0.874, SEM70.27) and asynchronous (0.655,
SEM70.27) cardio-visual feedback [t(20)¼1.884, p¼0.074, pFDR¼
0.074]. Importantly, there were no signiﬁcant main effects nor any
interaction in a second within-subject 2-way ANOVA using the
“control” ratings as the dependent variable [for condition (F(2,40)¼
1.482, p¼0.241), for feedback (F(1,20)¼1.191, p¼0.288), for the
interaction (F(2,40)¼0.259, p¼0.773)]. Planned t-tests comparing
synchronous and asynchronous feedback were non-signiﬁcant
(pFDR40.5 in all control conditions). Visual-analog ratings for the
control questions were all substantially lower than for the owner-
ship questions (Fig. 3) underlining that modulation of subjective
experience in this paradigm was speciﬁc to ownership. Together,
these ﬁndings conﬁrm that synchronous but not asynchronous
cardio-visual feedback enhances the experience of ownership of
the virtual hand.
One might worry that data from subjective questionnaires might
not be normally distributed, potentially undermining inferences
drawn using parametric ANOVA analysis. To reassure on this point
we note (i) our subjective data consisted of continuous responses (not
discrete Likert scale responses) and involved summing two separate
responses for each variable, thus facilitating normality, and (ii)
ANOVAs are in any case widely considered robust to deviations from
normality (Lix, Keselman, & Keselman, 1996). Nonetheless we expli-
citly tested for normality of the “ownership” and “control” variables in
each condition using the Lilliefors test. After correcting for multiple
comparisons all data sets passed this test. The full set of results from
these tests is given in Table S2 in the Supplementary information.
3.3. Relation between awareness of cardio-visual feedback accuracy
and EBO
We next wondered whether the experience of ownership was
inﬂuenced by the degree to which subjects were aware of feedback
synchrony. Addressing this, Q5 in the questionnaire asked partici-
pants to judge whether the visual feedback was synchronous with
their heartbeat (cardio-visual conditions) or with the tactile stimula-
tion (tactile condition). A within-subject 2-way ANOVA with average
responses to Q5 as the dependent variable showed a main effect of
feedback (F(1,20)¼49.70, po0.001) but not condition (F(2,40)¼
1.271, p40.25) with a signiﬁcant interaction between condition
and feedback (F(2,40)¼44.75, po0.001). Planned t-tests revealed
that participants detected synchronous feedback more accurately in
conditions “cardiac still” (t(20)¼3.020, p¼0.007, pFDR¼0.010) and
“tactile” (t(20)¼10.92, po0.0001, pFDRo0.0001) but not “cardiac
move” (t(20) ¼0.416, p¼0.682); see Fig. 4A. While tactile-visual
synchrony is obviously easy to notice for every participant (indeed it
is rarely tested in the classical RHI), the ﬁnding that cardio-visual
synchrony could also be detected (in the absence of distracting hand
movements) raised the possibility that the modulation of experience
of ownership in this condition may be mediated by awareness of this
relation. To explore this, we used a median split to divide participants
into two groups, based on their responses to Q5, to form “high” and
“low” awareness groups. The high awareness group was deﬁned by
correctly answering Q5 at or greater than the median rate (¼0.75) in
the “cardiac still” condition (n¼13), while the low awareness group
comprised those participants who correctly answered Q5 at less than
the median rate (n¼8). Fig. 4B shows PDD scores for these two
Fig. 4. Inﬂuence of cardio-visual feedback depends on awareness of synchrony. (A) Average visual analog responses to Q5 which asks participants to judge feedback
synchrony. (B) PDDs for synchronous and asynchronous cardio-visual feedback (condition “cardiac still” only) grouped into “low” and “high” awareness groups deﬁned by
accuracy of responses to Q5 (top panel); the same data are replotted as a scatter plot below. (C) Correlation between PDD and response to Q5 for all participants in condition
“cardiac still”; each point represents a single trial. There is a signiﬁcant positive correlation.
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groups for both asynchronous and synchronous cardio-visual feed-
back. A between-subject 22 ANOVA with PDD as the dependent
variable found no signiﬁcant main effects for either feedback
[synchronous vs. asynchronous (F(1,38)¼1.89, p¼0.177) or aware-
ness [“low aware” vs. “high aware”, (F(1,38)¼2.15, p¼0.151)], or their
interaction (F(1,41)¼0.69, p¼0.413). However, planned two-sample
t-tests comparing PDD values between cardio-visual feedback con-
ditions revealed signiﬁcantly greater PDD for synchronous than
asynchronous feedback for the high awareness group only (“high”,
t(12)¼2.996, p¼0.011, pFDR¼0.022; “low”, t(7) ¼0.643, p¼0.54). We
note that this result should be interpreted with caution given the lack
of a signiﬁcant interaction in the higher-order ANOVA.
To further examine this issue we computed the correlation
between PDD and responses to Q5, for all participants, in the
“cardiac still” condition. As shown in Fig. 4C there is a signiﬁcant
positive correlation (Spearman's rank¼0.231, p¼0.035). A similar
result holds for the correlation between Q5 responses and sub-
jective ownership scores (Spearman's rank¼0.297, p¼0.006).
Taken together, these analyses indicate that awareness of cardiac
synchrony may play an important role for experiences of owner-
ship when synchronous cardiac feedback is given.
3.4. Inﬂuence of cardio-visual feedback is associated with
interoceptive sensitivity
How do our results depend on individual interoceptive sensitiv-
ity (IS)? Fig. 5 shows correlations between PDD values (shown as
the difference between synchronous and asynchronous feedback)
and IS for both “cardiac still” and “tactile” conditions. (We do not
analyze “cardiac move” because of the lack of difference in PDD
between feedback conditions.) One outlier (based on three standard
deviations from the mean) was removed from the “tactile” condi-
tion. There was a signiﬁcant positive correlation between IS and
PDD in the “tactile” condition (Spearman's rank correlation coefﬁ-
cient 0.509, p¼0.022, pFDR¼0.044), and a non-signiﬁcant correla-
tion in the “cardiac still” condition (correlation¼0.207, p¼0.368).
We further analyzed this data by dividing participants into high IS
(n¼8) and low IS (n¼13) groups using a median (¼0.750) split.
Fig. 5B shows PDDs for each group in both feedback conditions and
for “tactile” and “cardiac still” conditions. In the “tactile” condition,
a 2-way ANOVAwith “feedback” and “IS group” as variables showed
a signiﬁcant main effect of feedback (F(1,36)¼4.98, p¼0.03), but
not for IS group (F(1,36)¼0.23, p¼0.64), nor for the interaction (F
(1,39)¼1.61, p¼0.21). However, planned t-tests comparing synchro-
nous versus asynchronous feedback showed a signiﬁcant difference
in PDD in the high IS group (t(14)¼3.06 po0.01, pFDR¼0.017), but
not the low IS group (t(22)¼0.67, p¼0.51) reﬂecting signiﬁcant
modulation of PDD by tactile-visual feedback for high IS partici-
pants only (high IS, sync¼6.09 cm, SEM71.18, async¼0.84 cm,
SEM71.24; low IS, sync¼4.91 cm, SEM71.47; async¼3.46 cm,
SEM 71.57). In the “cardiac still” condition a 2-way ANOVA showed
marginal main effects of feedback (F(1,38)¼3.49, p¼0.07) and IS
group (F(1,38)¼3.10, p¼0.09), with no signiﬁcant interaction (F
(1,41)¼0.10, p¼0.75). In this condition, while PDD was generally
higher for synchronous cardio-visual feedback (compatible with
Fig. 2), this difference did not signiﬁcantly differ between IS groups.
Fig. 5. Individual interoceptive sensitivity modulates the inﬂuence of feedback on the experience of ownership. (A) Correlation between individual IS and PDD (synchronous
minus asynchronous feedback) for both “tactile” and “cardiac still” conditions. (B) The same data grouped by a median split into low and high IS groups, showing PDD for
synchronous and asynchronous feedback separately.
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Planned t-tests between the feedback conditions did not show any
signiﬁcant differences. Analysis of subjective responses showed a
similar pattern. IS showed a marginal correlation with mean visual-
analog responses to ownership questions in the “tactile” (Spear-
man's rank¼0.427, p¼0.053, pFDR¼0.106) but no correlation in the
“cardiac still” condition (correlation¼0.02, p¼0.930). Because these
correlations were at best marginal we did not conduct a median
split analyses on these data.
4. Discussion
We sought to determine whether multisensory integration across
exteroceptive and interoceptive domains inﬂuences the experience
of body ownership (EBO) in a version of the rubber-hand illusion. We
combined augmented reality (AR) and simultaneous physiological
monitoring to implement a “virtual rubber hand” on which we
projected cardio-visual feedback so that the visual appearance of the
virtual hand was modulated by cardiac signals, either in-time or out-
of-time with each participant's heartbeat. We further examined the
role of proprioceptive-visual integration induced by ﬁnger move-
ments, and we related our observations to individual differences in
interoceptive sensitivity (IS). The ﬁndings establish directly that
multisensory integration of exteroceptive and interoceptive signals
can modulate EBO in the rubber hand illusion. Speciﬁcally, we found
that synchronous (as compared to asynchronous) cardio-visual feed-
back led to an enhanced experience of ownership of the virtual hand
(condition “cardiac still”), as measured objectively by proprioceptive
drift (Fig. 2), and subjectively by questionnaire (Fig. 3). This observa-
tion extends previous studies showing correlations between IS and
susceptibility to illusions of body ownership (Tsakiris et al., 2011) and
associations between speciﬁc physiological measures and RHI induc-
tion (Barnsley et al., 2011; Moseley et al., 2008). Our ﬁndings, in
relating to an accessible (and much studied) illusion, also extend
recent complementary observations of facilitation of proprioceptive
drift when cardiac signals are incorporated within a virtual reality
avatar in a generalized full-body illusion (Aspell et al., in press).
The results also replicate the classic RHI (condition “tactile”) by
showing that synchronous as compared to asynchronous tactile-
visual feedback enhanced EBO, again as measured both objectively
and subjectively. Condition “cardiac move” elicited strong EBO as
measured by both methods. This condition tested effects during both
(synchronous or asynchronous) types of cardio-visual feedback with
congruent (always synchronous) visual remapping of intentional
ﬁnger movements onto the virtual hand. Interestingly, neither
objective nor subjective measures differed as a function of cardio-
visual feedback, indicating that in this condition the integration of
proprioceptive and visual signals induced by the ﬁnger movements
dominated the inﬂuence of interoceptive feedback on EBO.
We found suggestive evidence that the strength of EBO (in the
condition “cardiac still”) depended on the degree towhich participants
were able consciously to discriminate synchronous from asynchronous
cardio-visual feedback (Fig. 4). This suggests that multisensory inte-
gration across interoceptive and exteroceptive domains modulates
EBO preferentially via consciously accessible representations of inter-
oceptive state. This result might suggest a positive correlation should
exist between individual IS and strength of the illusion. However,
while we observed a trend in this direction it did not reach
signiﬁcance (Fig. 5). We note the role of conscious mediation is usually
taken for granted in the classical RHI, in which it is trivially easy for
participants to distinguish synchronous from asynchronous tactile-
visual feedback (as we conﬁrm explicitly, Fig. 4A).
While the correlation between IS and PDD did not reach threshold
signiﬁcance in the “cardiac still” condition, we did observe a signiﬁcant
positive correlation between IS and PDD in the “tactile” condition
(Fig. 5). At ﬁrst glance this result appears to conﬂict with data reported
by Tsakiris et al. (2011) which show a signiﬁcant negative correlation
between IS and PDD in the classical RHI. These latter results have been
interpreted by the idea that low IS could mean that a participant is less
“in touch” with his/her own body and therefore more susceptible to
manipulations of EBO by exteroceptive cues (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013;
Tsakiris et al., 2011). What could account for the opposite pattern of
results in our data? One possibility is that Tsakiris et al. used a different
method for assessing IS based on asking subjects to count the number
of heartbeats in time-periods of varying lengths (Schandry, 1981).
Indeed when we repeated our IS measures using this task, there was
no signiﬁcant positive trend between IS and PDD (see Supplementary
information). There were also differences in the number of subjects in
our study (n¼21) and in the Tsakiris et al. study (n¼46), as well as
differences in mean IS across participants (0.77 vs. 0.64). These
differences could account for the discrepant results at least in part,
especially when recalling that our choice of IS method (Whitehead
et al., 1977) was motivated by its reliance on comparing interoceptive
and exteroceptive (auditory) signals: this method may be more likely
to be modulated by processes underlying multisensory integration
than the alternative “counting” method (Schandry, 1981).
A second possible explanation turns on the observation that
the classical RHI fake hand (as used by Tsakiris et al., 2011) is
usually very distinct visually from the appearance of a partici-
pant's real hand, whereas the virtual hand in our paradigm is a
high-ﬁdelity three-dimensional visual copy of each participant's
real hand. Thus, if high IS individuals place a higher weighting on
interoceptive signals (Tsakiris et al., 2011), this could lead to a
higher a priori willingness to accept the virtual hand in our
paradigm, as compared to the classical RHI where the a priori
plausibility of a rubber hand being part of the body is relatively
low. This difference in a priori plausibility could account for the
opposite relationships between IS and PDD in the two paradigms,
since synchronous tactile-visual feedback would be incongruent
with the prior in the classical RHI, and congruent with the prior in
our study. Taking this idea further it could be argued that our
paradigm assesses the extent to which participants feel embodied
in their own body (albeit with conﬂicting proprioceptive signals),
as compared to the classical RHI which assesses susceptibility to
incorporation of foreign bodies or body parts within the body
image. Further research is warranted discriminate these possible
explanations and to explore systematically how individual differ-
ences in IS correlate with susceptibility to manipulations of EBO
across paradigms.
The RHI has been explained with reference to models of multi-
sensory integration which propose that conﬂicts between vision,
touch, and proprioception are minimized by visual capture of visual
and felt (tactile) events occurring in close peri-hand space, on the
basis of statistical correlations among sensory signals together with
visual dominance (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Makin et al., 2008). This
process is argued to update self-representations to incorporate the
fake hand. However, updating of self-representations is evidently
constrained by prior “beliefs” on the reliability of sensory input (e.g.,
vision dominates proprioception in the classical RHI) and on the
plausibility of an object being part of the body. The latter point is
amply demonstrated by abolition of the RHI for non-hand-like
objects (Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Fotopoulou, 2010), and by
implausibly oriented or positioned fake hands (Ehrsson, Spence, &
Passingham, 2004; Lloyd, 2007; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). The
importance of peri-hand space can also be considered as a prior, in
the sense that sensory signals inferred to closely aligned spatial
locations are more likely to be interpreted as arising from a common
source. These observations are consistent with an emerging theore-
tical view of selfhood based on predictive coding which extends
multisensory integration accounts (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013; Seth et al.,
2011) and which also well accounts for both the interoceptive and
proprioceptive effects in the present results. Essentially, the
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predictive coding view adapts to the case of self-perception the
“Bayesian brain” framework, which describes perception as the
process of inference about the most likely causes of sensory input
(Clark, 2013; Friston, 2009). On this view, self-representations consist
in multi-level (hierarchical) generative (i.e., predictive) models of the
causes of those sensory signals which are deemed most likely to be
“me” (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013). In Bayesian terms, this is the posterior
probability of the most likely generative model (self-representation)
given a set of priors and current sensory input. Crucially, minimiza-
tion of prediction errors – such as those induced by multisensory
conﬂicts during the RHI – will update the posterior probabilities and,
over time, can induce changes in priors (perceptual learning). In
addition, priors reﬂecting high-level representations such as “self”
and body-ownership are likely to operate at relatively abstract
multisensory levels. Thus, statistical correlations among highly
weighted sensory signals (vision, touch) can overcome prediction
errors in a different modality (proprioception) leading to a revised
multisensory generative (predictive) model which minimizes the
overall level of self-related prediction error by incorporating the fake
hand as part of the self-representation.
Our results ﬁt nicely into such a predictive framework when it is
extended to incorporate interoceptive signals. “Interoceptive predic-
tive coding” (Seth et al., 2011; Critchley & Seth, 2012) is essentially
the idea that interoceptive self-representations – and emotional
feeling states – arise from generative models of causes (both external
and internal) of interoceptive afferents. In relation to the RHI this
means that interoceptive signals constitute just one more sensory
modality to be incorporated into multisensory predictive models of
the body and self. Thus, statistical correlations between interoceptive
(e.g., cardiac) and exteroceptive (e.g., visual) signals can lead to
updating of predictive models of self-signals throughminimization of
prediction error, just as may happen for exteroceptive multisensory
conﬂicts in the classic RHI. In other words, there is no need to assume
distinct modes of inﬂuence of exteroceptive and interoceptive signals
on EBO, for example that the former is based on multisensory
integration and the latter on trait-based modulation of this integra-
tion (Tsakiris et al., 2011). In addition, if it is further assumed that
predictive models are continually probed by control signals which
attempt to conﬁrm the currently dominant model [“active inference”,
Friston et al., 2010], the framework naturally accommodates the
phasic physiological changes accompanying RHI induction (Barnsley
et al., 2011; Moseley et al., 2008) when these changes are taken to
reﬂect altered autonomic control. Other recent results correlating
individual IS with susceptibility to changes in self-representation
under multisensory stimulation have also been interpreted within
this emerging framework (Tajadura-Jimenez & Tsakiris, in press).
A framework of predictive multisensory integration across
interoception and exteroception is further supported by anatomi-
cal and neuroimaging evidence. The right-hemisphere anterior
insular cortex provides one cortical focus for the integration of
exteroceptive and interoceptive signals (Craig, 2009; Critchley &
Harrison, 2013; Critchley et al., 2004; Seth et al., 2011). This region
has been proposed as a neural substrate for self-awareness in the
form of the “material me” (Craig, 2009), and is activated by
mismatches between predicted and actual interoceptive signals
induced by false physiological feedback (Gray, Harrison, Wiens, &
Critchley, 2007). In addition, anterior insular activity elicited
during intentional action is associated with interoceptive evalua-
tions of the affective consequences of motor intentions (Brass &
Haggard, 2010). Activity within the nearby mid-posterior insula
correlates with EBO during the classical RHI (Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy,
Haggard, & Fink, 2007), and damage to this area is associated with
delusions of body ownership including denial of paralysis and
somatoparaphrenia (Vallar & Ronchi, 2008). Thus the right insular
lobe could form a central hub within a functional network
instantiating predictive models of body ownership and self.
The strong experience of ownership during the “cardiac move”
condition for both synchronous and asynchronous cardio-visual feed-
back also makes sense in light of a predictive coding account. In this
condition, while there remains a conﬂict in global (relative to the
body) proprioceptive signals, the visual remapping of ﬁnger move-
ments to the virtual hand induces strong correlations between visual
signals and local (hand-related) proprioceptive input. This is another
example of active inference increasing the likelihood of incorporating
the virtual hand into the body image, as compared to the “cardiac still”
condition where no such movement-based active inference takes
place. Thus, in the “cardiac move” condition the visual and proprio-
ceptive signals are given sufﬁciently high weighting to suppress the
inﬂuence of interoceptive prediction error on the most likely pre-
dictive model. By the same token, when real-hand movements are not
reﬂected in the fake hand, as in the classical RHI, onewould expect the
illusion to be abolished, as indeed it is (Banissy & Ward, 2013; Tsakiris,
Longo, & Haggard, 2010). In addition, as suggested earlier, the close
visual similarity of the virtual hand in our paradigm – as compared to
the classical RHI – may induce a stronger prior that the virtual hand is
part of the body, such that increased IS could lead to increased
susceptibility to the RHI, as shown in our data (Fig. 5), and in contrast
to results found using the classical RHI (Tsakiris et al., 2011).
The “cardiac move” condition also highlights important connec-
tions between experiences of agency (i.e., the experience of being the
author of an action) and ownership (David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008;
Tsakiris et al., 2010). The real-time visual remapping of ﬁnger
movements in this condition does induce an experience of agency,
as compared to the other conditions, though this is not an effect we
measured formally in this study. Future research will adapt our
paradigm to assess systematically the relative contributions of motor
corollary discharge and both proprioceptive and visual prediction
errors in determining experiences of both ownership and agency. We
speculate that experienced agency will depend on highly weighted
proprioceptive prediction errors which are accounted for by a stack
of hierarchical predictions which include at higher levels those
related to intentions and goals.
In summary, our data show that multisensory integration of
interoceptive and exteroceptive signals can inﬂuence EBO in a manner
that is well accounted for by predictive models of multisensory
integration among self-related signals. The results underscore the
potential for combined AR and physiological monitoring within
experiments investigating how various aspects of selfhood depend
on predictive models of selfhood integrating interoceptive and exter-
oceptive domains.
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